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ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS AND THE EFFECTIVE USE OF 
MOBILE MONEY IN SOUTH AFRICA – PART 2* 
M Kersop** 
SF du Toit*** 
In Part 1 of this article, mobile money as a legal concept was examined, followed by 
a discussion of the way in which money laundering is regulated. Before making 
some recommendations, Part 2 of this article deals with the establishment and 
verification of identities and concludes by looking at mobile money and money 
laundering within the context of a risk-based approach. 
4  The establishment and verification of identities of clients as an AML 
measure 
According to FATF Recommendation 10, it should be illegal for financial institutions 
to keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names.1 
Furthermore, financial institutions should be obliged to implement customer due 
diligence (CDD) measures when establishing business relations2 – a principle which 
should  
The CDD measures which should be implemented include the identification of the 
client and the verification of the client's identity.3 Such verification should be done by 
                                                          
*  This article (in two parts) is based on M Kersop's mini-dissertation with the same title, submitted 
in partial fulfilment of an LLM in Import and Export Law at the Potchefstroom campus of the 
North-West University, prepared under the supervision of Prof SF du Toit.  
**  Marike Kersop. LLB LLM (NWU). Prosecutor, NPA and former LLM student, North-West 
University. Email: marike.kersop@gmail.com. 
***  Sarel Francois du Toit. BA LLB LLD (RAU). Professor of Law, North-West University. Email: 
sarel.dutoit@nwu.ac.za. 
1  See, in an admittedly different context dealing with delictual liability, the facts of Energy 
Measurements (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of SA Ltd 2001 3 SA 132 (W) (hereafter the Energy 
Measurements case), where the court did not specifically consider the use of a so-called "trade 
name". 
2  International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and 
Proliferation: FATF Recommendations (2012) (hereafter FATF Recommendations) 10(i); FATF 
Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Prepaid Cards, Mobile Payments and Internet-Based 
Payment Services (2013) (hereafter FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach) para 93(a). This 
is not the only instance in which CDD measures should be taken, but it does form the focal point 
of this article. See FATF Recommendations 10(ii)-(iv) for other instances when CDD measures 
should be taken.  
3  De Koker South African Money Laundering para 8.01. 
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making use of "reliable, independent source documents, data or information."4 The 
purpose of the CDD measures is to enable financial institutions to effectively identify, 
verify and monitor their clients and the transactions they enter into, in relation to the 
money laundering risks that they pose.5 
Compliance with FATF Recommendation 10 can be found in section 21(1) of FICA,6 
which states that" 
An accountable institution may not establish a business relationship or conclude a 
single transaction with a client unless the accountable institution has taken the 
prescribed steps- 
(a) to establish and verify the identity of the client; 
(b) if the client is acting on behalf of another person, to establish and verify- 
(i)  the identity of that other person; and 
(ii) the client's authority to establish the business relationship or to conclude the 
single transaction on behalf of that other person; and 
(c) if another person is acting on behalf of the client, to establish and verify- 
(i)  the identity of that other person; and 
(ii) that other person's authority to act on behalf of the client. 
Guidance Note 3A reiterates this by stating that client identification and verification 
must be done "at the outset of the business relationship or single transaction."7 
Regulation 3(1)8 prescribes what such identification and verification of clients9 
should entail:10 
                                                          
4  FATF Recommendations 10(a); FATF Guidance: Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
Measures and Financial Inclusion (2013) (hereafter FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion) 
para 65(a). Again this is the CDD measure on which the focus of this article will fall. See FATF 
Recommendations 10(b)-(d) for other CDD measures. 
5  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 92; FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion 
para 61. Also see De Koker South African Money Laundering para 8.35. 
6  De Koker South African Money Laundering para 8.02; Van Jaarsveld Aspects of Money 
Laundering 637. 
7  Financial Intelligence Centre Guidance Note 3A: Guidance for Accountable Institutions on Client 
Identification and Verification and Related Matters (28 March 2013) (hereafter Guidance Note 
3A) para 10. 
8  GN R1595 in GG 24176 of 20 December 2002. 
9  Reg 3(2) also provides for instances where a person wishing to establish a business relationship 
or conclude a single transaction with an accountable institution as contemplated in Reg 3(1) 
does not have the legal capacity to do so without another person's assistance. In such an 
instance, the person assisting the potential client must furnish the following particulars to the 
accountable institution: (a) his or her full names; (b) his or her date of birth; (c) his or her 
identity number; (d) his or her residential address; and (e) his or her contact particulars. This is 
in line with Interpretive Note 4 to FATF Recommendations 10, which states that "when 
performing elements (a) and (b) of the CDD measures specified under Recommendation 10, 
financial institutions should also be required to verify that any person purporting to act on behalf 
of the customer is so authorised, and should identify and verify the identity of that person". 
M KERSOP & SF DU TOIT  PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
1639 
 
An accountable institution must obtain from, or in respect of, a natural person who 
is a citizen of, or resident in, the Republic, that person's– 
(a) full names; 
(b) date of birth; 
(c) identity number; 
(d) income tax registration number, if such a number has been issued to that 
person; and 
(e) residential address. 
If these regulations are applied to mobile money providers as accountable 
institutions and followed stringently, the opening of mobile money accounts will in 
certain instances be made impossible or difficult, since the verification of this 
information can prove troublesome, especially with regard to the residential 
address.11 The verification of clients' addresses has indeed presented certain 
complications in South Africa, particularly in the case of low-income individuals.12 
Migrant labourers who live in informal settlements, for example, encounter 
substantial obstacles in accessing formal remittance services since they cannot 
readily verify their residential addresses in most instances.13 Research done by the 
World Bank has also pointed out that a lack of verifying documentation is often one 
of the main reasons why people do not have accounts.14 It is also the finding of 
FATF that the client identity verification15 stage is the most difficult and onerous part 
of the CDD process.16 It is thus clear that arduous verification requirements can be 
counterproductive to financial inclusion.17 
It is therefore a positive sign that the South African legislator was mindful of the fact 
that prospective clients who live in informal settlements and rural areas could 
encounter difficulties in verifying their residential addresses in conformity with the 
regulatory provisions.18 An exception to the obligation to provide a residential 
address, amongst other things, was consequently created by means of the well-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10  De Koker South African Money Laundering para 8.04. 
11  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 299. See also FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion 
para 79. 
12  De Koker South African Money Laundering para 8.35-8.36; Lawack 2013 WJLTA 332. 
13  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 339; FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 23. 
14  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 79. 
15  Which, in South Africa, entails the verification of a residential address in order to ensure that 
identity fraud has not been committed. See Lawack 2013 WJLTA 332. 
16  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 78. 
17  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 78. 
18  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 332. 
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known Exemption 17.19 Exemption 17 exempts certain financial institutions20 from 
having to comply with selected provisions of section 21 of FICA and Regulations 3 
and 4 when dealing with certain types of accounts,21 to the effect that a customer's 
residential address does not need to be obtained or verified. Mobile money transfer 
businesses, however, do not fall under the scope of this exemption.22 In other 
words, Exemption 17 is not applicable to financial institutions that provide mobile 
money transfers (ie remittance services) as their only business.23 With that being 
said, attention is focused on the requirement of supplying and verifying a residential 
address once again. 
According to Regulation 4(3), an accountable institution must verify the residential 
address referred to in Regulation 3(1)(e) or 3(2)(f) by comparing these details with 
"information which can reasonably be expected to achieve such verification and is 
obtained by reasonably practical means",24 taking into consideration any applicable 
guidance notes concerning the verification of identities.25 
Guidance Note 3A, which was published by the FIC on 28 March 2013 and which is 
applicable to all accountable institutions under Schedule 1 of FICA26 addresses, inter 
alia, the potential difficulty of complying with this regulation27 by dealing with 
several issues which will consequently be discussed. According to Guidance Note 3A, 
the most secure form of confirmation of a residential address would be for a staff 
member and/or agent of the accountable institution to visit the residential address 
provided by the natural person applying for an account, in order to confirm that the 
                                                          
19  GN R1353 in GG 27011 of 19 November 2004; De Koker South African Money Laundering para 
8.36. 
20  These institutions are the following: a person who carries on the "business of a bank" as defined 
in the Banks Act 94 of 1990, a mutual bank as defined in the Mutual Banks Act 124 of 1993, the 
Postbank referred to in s 51 of the Postal Services Act 124 of 1998, and the Ithala Development 
Finance Corporation Limited.  
21  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 337. See Exemption 17(3)(a)-(d) for the types of accounts which are 
included under this exemption. 
22  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 339. 
23  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 338-339. The Banks Act Guidance Note 6/2008 issued by the Registrar of 
Banks has, however, brought mobile banking products within the framework of Exemption 17.  
24  Reg 4(3) (GN R1595 in GG 24176 of 20 December 2002). 
25  Reg 4(3) (GN R1595 in GG 24176 of 20 December 2002). 
26  Preface to Guidance Note 3A. 
27  De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law para 8.19. 
M KERSOP & SF DU TOIT  PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
1641 
 
person indeed resides at the specified residential address.28 Logic dictates that this is 
highly impractical and that it would be an adequate measure of verification in most 
cases to review an original document29 that offers a reasonable confirmation of the 
information in question, and to obtain a copy of such a document.30 
According to the FIC, accountable institutions had been applying a restrictive 
approach regarding which types of documentation will be accepted to verify the 
residential address of a client,31 which had resulted in the frustration of the 
verification process (which ultimately led to the exacerbation of financial 
exclusion).32 The FIC accordingly took steps to mitigate this situation by providing 
guidance in paragraph 11 of Guidance Note 3A regarding which documents qualify 
as acceptable verification documentation.33 This paragraph includes a list of 
examples of documentation that may be used to verify the residential address of a 
natural person. This list is not exhaustive, and other documents may be used if 
circumstances deem it necessary.34 
 Documents which, according to paragraph 11 of Guidance Note 3A, may offer proof 
of the residential address of a person35 include, inter alia,36 the following: 
 a utility bill;37 
 a recent lease or rental agreement; 
 a municipal rates and taxes statement; 
 a telephone or cellular account; 
 a valid television licence; 
                                                          
28  Guidance Note 3A para 11; De Koker South African Money Laundering para 8.19. 
29  Supplied by the person applying for the account. 
30  Guidance Note 3A para 11. 
31  Guidance Note 3A para 11. 
32  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 39.  
33  De Koker South African Money Laundering para 8.19; Lawack 2013 WJLTA 338. This action 
taken by the FIC was in accordance with the FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion, which 
states in para 39 that regulators should provide further guidance when institutions overestimate 
money laundering risks or adopt overly-conservative control measures. 
34  Decisions as to how residential addresses are to be verified should be based on an accountable 
institution's risk framework, according to Guidance Note 3A para 11. 
35  Ie documents containing both the residential address and names of the person. 
36  Only documents that would be applicable to an unbanked person will be included for the 
purposes of this article. 
37  Including that of a telephone or cellular account, Eskom or a local authority. 
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 recent motor vehicle licence documentation; or 
 a statement of account issued by a retail store that reflects the residential 
address of the person.38 
Provision is furthermore made for instances where a utility bill does not identify the 
physical street address of the property owner because it is sent to a postal address. 
In this case, the utility bill will still be an acceptable form of verification provided the 
client's name and the relevant erf number or stand number and township39 details 
are contained therein. The client's physical address, erf number and township should 
then be documented by the institution, after which the institution should cross-
reference the township to the suburb in which the client resides. Details can also be 
verified with reference to the Deeds Office if there remains any doubt about the 
client's residential particulars. 
If none of the above can be provided by the client, other ways to verify a client's 
address may be explored. The example expressly provided for by Guidance Note 3A 
is that of an affidavit from the client's employer or a person cohabiting with the 
client, stating the name, residential address and identity number of both the client 
and the deponent of the affidavit, together with particulars about the relationship 
between the client and the deponent of the affidavit and confirmation of the client's 
residential address.40 
It should be noted that while Guidance Note 3A does offer considerable leniency to 
accountable institutions regarding the documents which may be used for residential 
address verification purposes, the FIC is still of the opinion that the address slips 
issued by the Department of Home Affairs, which are found in the back cover of 
South African identity documents, do not constitute information that can "reasonably 
be expected to achieve verification of a person's current address."41 The reason for 
                                                          
38  Guidance Note 3A para 11. 
39  The word "township" should be interpreted in the legal sense of the word in this instance, as 
opposed to the meaning it would have in terms of South African vernacular. 
40  Guidance Note 3A para 11. 
41  As per the requirement in Reg 4(3) (GN R1595 in GG 24176 of 20 December 2002). FATF 
Recommendations 10(a) requires financial institutions to verify the client's identity using reliable, 
independent source documents, data or information. This is reiterated in FATF Guidance: AML 
and Financial Inclusion para 77, which goes on to say that "when determining the degree of 
M KERSOP & SF DU TOIT  PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
1643 
 
this is that the FIC does not regard these address slips as independent source 
documents.42 Furthermore, the information contained in an address slip may be 
outdated.43 
The reasonable inference that can thus be drawn from the above is that the FIC's 
aim in paragraph 11 of Guidance Note 3A is to urge accountable institutions to 
accept as many secure forms of verification as possible (i.e. to promote financial 
inclusion) as long as this is not done the expense of financial integrity. It would thus 
seem as if accountable institutions are encouraged to follow a risk-based approach44 
when establishing and verifying customer identity, rather than a rigid, uniform 
approach.45  
It is clear, however, that the obligation on financial institutions to obtain and verify 
residential addresses as part of CDD appears to have been the chosen safeguard 
against identity fraud46 and that the South African legislator is not willing to do away 
with this safeguard lightly. The need for providing a residential address for the 
purposes of aiding the identification of a client has, however, been questioned by 
academics such as De Koker.47 Lawack submits that if an accountable institution can 
obtain a client's name, date of birth, and unique national identity number, it is 
unnecessary to obtain a residential address as well, since it will not add significant 
value to the identification process, but will undoubtedly cause an unnecessary 
setback for clients who do not have formal addresses.48 This is quite apparent from 
the practical difficulties that have been experienced to date in South Africa in 
verifying the residential addresses of low-income individuals in particular.49 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reliability and independence of such documentation, countries should take into account the 
potential risks of fraud and counterfeiting in a particular country. It is the responsibility of each 
country to determine what can constitute 'reliable, independent source documents, data or 
information' under its AML regime". 
42  Guidance Note 3A para 7.  
43  Guidance Note 3A para 7.   
44  The notion of a risk-based approach will be discussed extensively in para 5 below. 
45  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 338.  
46  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 336. 
47  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 336; De Koker 2004 TSAR 742. 
48  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 336; De Koker 2004 TSAR 742. 
49  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 336; De Koker 2004 TSAR 742. 
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From the above it is clear that South Africa has a reasonably extensive AML 
framework which, although it is on par with international standards such as the FATF 
Recommendations, makes provision for the unique South African socio-economic 
setup – to a certain extent. It would seem that an over-cautious approach to CDD 
could be what is hampering the widespread development and acceptance of mobile 
money as a tool for financial inclusion.50 The application of a risk-based approach 
and the benefits it could hold for the full development of the potential that mobile 
money holds will now be explored. 
5  Mobile money, money laundering and the risk-based approach 
5.1  Introduction 
The basic principle of criminology is the following: crime follows opportunity.51 The 
patterns of crime involving technology have the capability to rapidly adapt, as new 
advances in technology occur.52 The expansion of mobile internet systems holds the 
potential of providing novel opportunities for criminals in general, but also 
specifically in the domain of mobile financial services.53 This section will explore 
                                                          
50  When considering a bank's potential delictual liability when opening an account, the approach 
seems to be (perhaps, at first blush, contrary to the notion of financial inclusion) to expect banks 
to do much more than merely collect specifically listed information to identify a client, and to 
verify the client's identity. (See Malan, Pretorius and Du Toit Malan on Bills of Exchange 410 fn 
79 where a tentative suggestion is made in respect of the limited importance of the information 
required in terms of FICA, in cases of delictual liability.) In the Energy Measurements case, when 
the court considered the negligence of the bank, the court stated: "… it seems to be generally 
accepted that, as a minimum, a bank has the duty to ascertain the identity of a prospective 
client and to obtain some information to establish the bona fides of the prospective customer" 
(Energy Measurements case para 125, our emphasis). The court further held: "The very least 
that is required of a bank is to properly consider all the documentation that is placed before it 
and to apply their minds thereto" (Energy Measurements case para 134, our emphasis). These 
requirements are, it is suggested, much more onerous than those of FICA. In Columbus Joint 
Venture v ABSA Bank Ltd 2002 1 SA 90 (SCA) (the court a quo's decision is reported in Columbus 
Joint Venture v ABSA Bank Ltd 2000 2 SA 491 (W)), another decision dealing with a bank's 
delictual liability, Cameron JA explained why more is apparently expected of a bank when 
opening an account for a new client (para 9) – quite often the person wanting to make use of 
mobile money, would, for example, not have an existing relationship with the bank or another 
provider. The approach in these cases is understandable specifically within the context of the 
delictual liability of banks, and indeed preferable as well. When dealing with financial inclusion 
and the consideration of people who might not have access to financial services at all, different 
considerations may apply. It might well be beneficial to keep the principles of a risk-based 
approach, as argued for in para 5 below, in mind in these instances as well. 
51  Grabosky, Smith and Dempsey Electronic Theft 1. 
52  Avina 2011 JFC 286.  
53  Avina 2011 JFC 286.  
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perceived versus actual financial integrity risks in terms of mobile financial services,54 
the way in which CDD serves to mitigate these risks, the negative impact that over-
regulation can have on financial inclusion, and a possible solution to the problem of 
over-regulation. Finally, the South African legal position regarding CDD and over-
regulation will be discussed briefly. 
5.2  Financial integrity risks linked to mobile money: perceptions versus 
reality 
Many regulators worldwide fear that mobile financial services hold serious financial 
integrity risks,55 since mobile financial services in general are often perceived as 
presenting unique risks compared to their traditional counterparts. The six major 
financial integrity concerns in this regard, as identiﬁed by the World Bank, are 
unknown identity, false identiﬁcation, smurﬁng, increased transaction speed, so-
called phone "pooling"56 and phone "delegation",57 and a lack of regulation of 
providers of mobile financial services.58 The rationale behind each of these fears will 
now be briefly discussed. 
5.2.1 Perceived financial integrity risks of mobile financial services 
5.2.1.1 Unknown identity 
For many regulators, the greatest financial integrity concern in terms of mobile 
financial services is a lack of information about the client's identity.59 This is 
beneficial to money launderers, since it could facilitate the conclusion of transactions 
without any name attached to them, thereby providing a disguise for money 
launderers under which to operate.60 
                                                          
54  Chatain et al World Bank Working Paper No 146 (hereafter World Bank Working Paper No 146) 
xiii. 
55  World Bank Working Paper No 146 xiii, 2, 11. 
56  Ie when several individuals share a few mobile phones. This practice is prevalent in poorer 
communities. See World Bank Working Paper No 146 12. 
57  As opposed to pooling, delegation is observed in wealthier communities. This is the practice in 
terms of which an agent or "delegate" is appointed to operate a mobile phone on behalf of the 
owner thereof. See World Bank Working Paper No 146 12. 
58  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 288; World Bank Working Paper No 146 12. 
59  World Bank Working Paper No 146 11. 
60  World Bank Working Paper No 146 12. 
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5.2.1.2 False identification 
The use of counterfeit documentation by money launderers in order to avoid 
detection is considered a grave risk in terms of mobile financial services. The 
conditions which must be complied with in order to obtain a mobile phone often 
differ greatly from the conditions which must be complied with before a bank 
account can be opened.61 Money launderers make use of pseudonyms or third-party 
names and personal particulars.62 Alternatively, a mobile phone which is already 
linked to a mobile money account may be supplied to money launderers by a third 
party who is supportive of their criminal activities. Mobile phones may also be stolen 
for the purposes of laundering money under a false identity.63 
5.2.1.3 Smurﬁng 
Mobile money seems to be very susceptible to smurﬁng, because it enables a large 
amount of money that is being transferred to be hidden as smaller, more 
inconspicuous amounts.64 Mobile financial services in general also seem to provide a 
very convenient tool for the "layering" of funds by concealing the illegal origins 
thereof by means of intricate movements, especially since mobile financial services 
are considerably less expensive than traditional ﬁnancial services.65 Small 
transactions initiated from several different mobile money accounts might go 
unnoticed. Several different senders may also channel funds into a primary mobile 
money account,66 like the manner in which EFTs or wire transfers are utilised in 
money laundering operations.  
5.2.1.4 Transaction speed  
The fact that mobile financial services enable the rapid performance of transactions 
is perceived to be very beneficial to money launderers.67 Mobile money offers a safe, 
                                                          
61  World Bank Working Paper No 146 12. 
62  Kellerman Mobile Risk Management 7; World Bank Working Paper No 146 12. 
63  World Bank Working Paper No 146 12. 
64  World Bank Working Paper No 146 12. 
65  Solin and Zerzan Mobile Money 14; World Bank Working Paper No 146 12. 
66  World Bank Working Paper No 146 12. 
67  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 287; World Bank Working Paper No 146 2 
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convenient and quick manner of transferring money, not only to legitimate clients, 
but also to criminals.68 
5.2.1.5 Pooling and delegation  
Pooling and delegation share the same perceived financial integrity risk, namely that 
a money launderer's identity can be easily obscured since the mobile phone which 
was used to commit a money laundering offence is not necessarily registered in the 
perpetrator's name.69 
5.2.1.6 Lack of regulation 
Concern exists over the fact that providers of mobile financial services are not 
subject to the same regulatory measures as other ﬁnancial institutions.70 AML 
controls, which are standard practice among traditional ﬁnancial institutions such as 
banks, are not necessarily observed by mobile financial services providers.71 This is 
especially true in terms of the operator-centric mobile money business model, where 
the provider of the service is an MNO and not a bank.72 Since the primary business 
of MNOs is communication and not financial services, it may often be the case that 
MNOs are not subject to an AML regulatory regime.73 Even if an MNO itself is 
compliant with AML measures, it could be that its agents are not. Dirty money can 
easily slip through these cracks and mobile financial services can be abused without 
enforcement authorities being aware thereof.74 
These fears are not unfounded, especially not in the context of mobile money. While 
it is true that mobile money creates significant opportunities for increased financial 
inclusion, it also poses signiﬁcant money laundering risks, since it is the mobile 
financial services model which deviates the most from traditional ﬁnancial services 
models.75 It makes provision for a completely unique manner of performing ﬁnancial 
                                                          
68  See World Bank Working Paper No 146 2, 12 in this regard. 
69  World Bank Working Paper No 146 13. 
70  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 287; World Bank Working Paper No 146 2. 
71  World Bank Working Paper No 146 40. 
72  World Bank Working Paper No 146 40. 
73  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 287; World Bank Working Paper No 146 40. 
74  World Bank Working Paper No 146 13. 
75  In comparison to mobile banking, for example. See World Bank Working Paper No 146 28.  
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transactions and is the fastest developing mobile financial service. As such, it 
presents not only the greatest potential for development, but also for manipulation 
and exploitation.76 There are four proven money laundering risk factors which are 
observed in all mobile financial services, namely anonymity, elusiveness, rapidity, 
and poor oversight,77 each of which will accordingly be briefly discussed.  
5.2.2  Proven financial integrity risks of mobile financial services 
5.2.2.1 Anonymity 
"Anonymity" is the risk of being unfamiliar with a client's true identity, which could 
result in the unauthorised use of an existing mobile financial services account by 
means, for example, of the theft of a mobile phone.78 There is also the risk of its 
facilitating the opening of multiple accounts in order to obscure the true value of 
deposits. 79 Not being familiar with clients' identities also allows dirty money to be 
easily withdrawn. Since suspicious names cannot be flagged by the system, the 
abuse of mobile financial services is a safe way for known criminals to conduct their 
money laundering operations.80 This risk can be mitigated only through the 
implementation of enhanced CDD measures.81  
5.2.2.2 Elusiveness 
"Elusiveness" is the ease with which the source, destination, and sum of a mobile 
transaction can be camouflaged,82 and is a risk factor which is particularly prevalent 
in mobile money services.83 Using multiple mobile money accounts makes it possible 
to carry out untraceable transactions,84 and money launderers can therefore indeed 
utilise mobile money services to conceal the original source of illicitly obtained 
funds.85 Mobile money also allows for a large transfer of funds to be divided into 
                                                          
76  As mentioned in ch 2. See World Bank Working Paper No 146 28.  
77  World Bank Working Paper No 146 xiii, 13. 
78  World Bank Working Paper No 146 xiii, 71. 
79  Solin and Zerzan Mobile Money 14. 
80  Solin and Zerzan Mobile Money 14. 
81  World Bank Working Paper No 146 xiv, 71. 
82  World Bank Working Paper No 146 xiv. 
83  World Bank Working Paper No 146 28.  
84  Solin and Zerzan Mobile Money 14; World Bank Working Paper No 146 28, 71.  
85  World Bank Working Paper No 146 28.  
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several smaller sums, causing the transfers to arouse less suspicion and hampering 
the ability of mobile money service providers and authorities to detect the money 
laundering action86 – exactly as regulators fear. It is submitted that the use of 
mobile money services therefore facilitates smurfing by its very nature, and so has 
the potential to be a prime tool in money laundering operations. It is understandable 
that concerns exist about the detrimental effect that mobile money can have on 
financial integrity.87 The risk of elusiveness can be mitigated by means of setting 
transaction limits, enhanced client CDD, and reporting.88  
5.2.2.3 Rapidity 
"Rapidity" is the speed with which illegal transactions can be conducted.89 Mobile 
financial services pose a money laundering risk in terms of rapidity, since the system 
allows illicitly obtained funds to be deposited into one account and transferred to 
another within a very short space of time. Since transactions conducted by means of 
mobile financial services take place in real time, it is difficult for authorities to 
prevent the transaction from being completed if money laundering is suspected. 
Mobile financial services make it possible for illegal earnings to be moved through 
the financial system rapidly, after which the money can be withdrawn from another 
account.90 The risk which is posed by such rapidity can be mitigated by ﬂagging 
certain types of transactions and managing the risks of third-party providers.91 
5.2.2.4 Poor oversight 
Poor oversight does not constitute a substantive risk on its own, but rather 
contributes to and exacerbates the three aforementioned risks, which are inherent in 
mobile financial services.92 A lack of proper oversight may cause mobile financial 
services to pose a systemic risk.93 Poor oversight can be mitigated by the setting of 
clear guidelines regarding mobile financial services, better licensing, the regulation 
                                                          
86  World Bank Working Paper No 146 28.  
87  Grabosky, Smith and Dempsey Electronic Theft 1. 
88  World Bank Working Paper No 146 xiv, 72. 
89  World Bank Working Paper No 146 xiv, 72. 
90  Solin and Zerzan Mobile Money 14. 
91  World Bank Working Paper No 146 xiv, 72. 
92  World Bank Working Paper No 146 13. 
93  Solin and Zerzan Mobile Money 14. 
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of providers, and successful risk supervision within bank and non-bank mobile 
financial service providers.94 
It is thus clear that all of the perceived risks are in fact real, since each perceived 
risk can be linked to one of the aforementioned proven risk factors.95 It is also clear, 
however, that there are mitigating measures which can be taken in each instance to 
decrease the risk. It stands to reason that regulators will aim to address their 
concerns by implementing the available AML measures as strictly as possible. 
As previously said, however, FATF concedes that a so-called "overly cautious 
approach" to AML measures could inadvertently lead to the exclusion of legitimate 
individuals from the financial system.96 Financial exclusion could, in turn, 
compromise the effectiveness of an AML regime. Therefore, financial inclusion 
initiatives and AML measures should be viewed as "serving complementary 
objectives."97 There are three fundamental aspects of mobile money which can 
further both financial inclusion and financial integrity. First, the use of mobile money 
could lead to decreased reliance on cash, which is the "common enemy" of both 
financial inclusion and financial integrity. Secondly, mobile money generates data, 
which may benefit financial inclusion and financial integrity. Lastly, mobile money 
facilitates an increase in the number of accounts, which is at the core of both 
financial inclusion and financial integrity.98 Winn and De Koker are of the opinion 
that mobile money will, however, not be in a position to reach its full potential for 
furthering financial inclusion and financial integrity unless certain regulatory barriers 
are removed.99  
South African AML regulations predominantly influence mobile money by means of 
CDD requirements, which financial institutions are expected to observe.100 The 
current position in most instances is that the same CDD requirements exist for all 
categories of accounts, regardless of what amounts are held in or can be transferred 
                                                          
94  World Bank Working Paper No 146 xiv, 29, 72. 
95  See World Bank Working Paper No 146 13 for more detail in this regard. 
96  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 2. 
97  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 3. 
98  Winn and De Koker 2013 WJLTA 159; Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 287. 
99  Winn and De Koker 2013 WJLTA 159. 
100  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 332. 
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by means of these accounts.101 This is counterproductive since it defeats the very 
objective of CDD measures and causes the general system to be unproductive. As 
was seen above, stipulating the implementation of uniform CDD measures has the 
result that certain individuals will not be in a position to open accounts, solely 
because they are not in possession of the required documentation.102 As a result, 
these individuals will be compelled to resort to informal financial instruments or 
services which are not subject to AML measures.103 Thus, the financial inclusion 
potential of mobile money will be lost for these individuals, and the opportunity to be 
involved in a financial system with improved financial integrity will not be available to 
them. This having been said, it cannot be denied that client identification and 
verification are among the most fundamental measures for mitigating for money 
laundering risks, and should enjoy continued implementation. 
5.3  Customer due diligence, mobile money and the risk-based approach 
As has been indicated above, mobile money service providers are "accountable 
institutions"104 which usually establish business relationships with clients as provided 
for by FATF Recommendation 10, and as such they will consequently be subject to 
the provisions of legislation enacted by virtue of FATF Recommendation 10, such as 
section 21 of FICA.105  
Implementing CDD measures can, however, pose a challenge for financial 
institutions.106 In this regard it is imperative to make a distinction between 
identifying a client and verifying a client's identification. Client identification consists 
of obtaining information with regard to the prospective client for the purpose of 
identifying the client. No documentation is gathered at this stage, as opposed to the 
stage where the client's identification is verified, which involves scrutinising "reliable, 
independent source documentation, data or information" that verifies the 
                                                          
101  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 299. 
102  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 299. 
103  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 299; FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 2; 
FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 38. 
104  See para 3.2.3 of Part 1 of this article. 
105  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 94; FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion 
para 64. 
106  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 66.  
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authenticity of the information that was collected during the preceding process of 
identification.107  
As was seen in paragraph 3 of Part 1, South African AML measures give rise to 
certain practical complications as far as identification and verification requirements 
are concerned. It should be stressed that these difficulties are not brought about by 
the FATF Recommendations. In an ordinary CDD situation, the FATF 
Recommendations, unlike FICA, do not necessitate the collection of information 
regarding facts such as residential addresses.108 Instead, FATF Recommendation 10 
makes it clear that although it should be obligatory for financial institutions to 
implement CDD measures, the scope of such measures should be established by 
means of a risk-based approach (RBA).109  
The notion behind an RBA is, in essence, that jurisdictions are permitted and 
encouraged to do away with uniform or so-called "one-size-fits-all" approaches to 
AML regimes, and to adapt existing AML regimes according to "specific national risk 
context."110 The RBA places an obligation on jurisdictions to follow a stricter 
approach in instances where higher money laundering risks have been identified, 
and gives them the option to follow a simplified approach in the instances where 
lower money laundering risks have been identified.111 It furthermore allows for 
exemptions from specific AML requirements in certain justified cases.112 The nature 
and intensity of the money laundering risks identified will consequently determine 
                                                          
107  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 66. 
108  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 67. 
109  In accordance with the Interpretive Notes to FATF Recommendations 10 and 1. Also see FATF 
Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 95; De Koker South African Money Laundering paras 
8.22 and 8.22A. 
110  FATF Recommendations 1; Interpretive Note 2 to FATF Recommendation 1; FATF Guidance for a 
Risk-Based Approach paras 64, 90; FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 37. 
111  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach paras 64, 90. Simplified CDD measures can, for 
instance, be considered where NPPS pose lower risks. See FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based 
Approach para 95. 
112  Interpretive Note 2 to FATF Recommendation 1; FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach paras 
64, 87, 90. See Interpretive Note 6 to FATF Recommendations 1 regarding conditions which 
need to be met before exemption will be justified. CDD has, however, proven to be an effective 
measure to mitigate money laundering risk associated with NPPS (see FATF Guidance for a Risk-
Based Approach para 63) and as such it is unlikely that jurisdictions will exempt NPPS providers 
from being subject to CDD measures altogether. 
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the stringency of AML measures under the RBA.113 Following an RBA thus enables 
jurisdictions to implement AML measures which are more accommodating towards 
clients and financial institutions alike, thereby enabling them to assign their 
resources more efficiently and implement preventative measures which are 
proportionate to identified risks, placing them in a position to focus their efforts on 
combating money laundering effectively.114  
The G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion (2010) also promote the 
application of the so-called "proportionality principle,"115 which entails finding the 
correct balance between risks and benefits and accordingly shaping AML regulation 
to mitigate the money laundering risk of the mobile financial service "without 
imposing an undue regulatory burden that could stifle innovation".116 An RBA will 
prevent the imposition of unwarranted and disproportionate AML obligations, 
including requirements that may impede access to mobile money for unbanked 
individuals.117 An RBA to mobile money thus enables jurisdictions to effectively 
address the problem of financial exclusion, which embodies a money laundering risk 
and an obstruction to accomplishing successful implementation of the FATF 
Recommendations in itself,118 by allowing both regulators and mobile money 
providers to tailor AML frameworks so as to "better align financial inclusion and 
financial integrity objectives".119 
The fact that the FATF encourages and indeed recommends the implementation of 
an RBA towards AML is set out at the very onset of the FATF Recommendations – in 
FATF Recommendation 1. According to this Recommendation, the risks of money 
laundering should first be identified, assessed, and understood, after which 
                                                          
113  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 90; Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 287. 
114  Interpretive Note 1 to FATF Recommendation 1; FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 
89. 
115  G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion Principle 8. 
116  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 87.  
117  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 86.  
118  Continued financial exclusion leads to a continued increase in transactions being conducted 
through the informal financial system, away from regulatory and supervisory oversight. See FATF 
Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 90; FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion paras 
37, 38; Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 300. 
119  De Koker 2013 WJLTA 182. 
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appropriate measures to mitigate the risk should be adopted.120 This is an essential 
first step in applying an RBA121 and an all-encompassing principle which must be 
kept in mind in applying any AML measure provided for by the FATF 
Recommendations.122  
The general application of an RBA can allow for flexibility regarding CDD measures, 
inter alia.123 The FATF's stance on simplified CDD, specifically in the context of 
NPPS,124 will now be discussed against the backdrop of the South African legal 
position.125 
5.3.1 Simplified customer due diligence, mobile money and FATF 
When developing an AML regime for NPPS such as mobile money, the effect that 
proposed regulation will have on the existing NPPS market should be taken into 
consideration.126 Ideally steps should be taken to ensure that AML measures remain 
commensurate with the money laundering risks posed by NPPS. Regulators should 
contemplate the potential benefits and the potential detriments and then take a 
pragmatic RBA to CDD.127 Failure to do this may affect the operation of existing 
NPPS in a negative manner, or stifle the progress of yet-to-be-developed NPPS.128  
When exploring the options of applying an RBA, it should be kept in mind that 
different financial products and services hold different risks for the financial 
system.129 It is for this reason that FATF Recommendation 15 is of specific relevance 
                                                          
120  Interpretive Note 2 to FATF Recommendation 1 makes it clear that in implementing an RBA 
financial institutions should have processes in place to identify, assess, monitor, manage and 
mitigate money laundering risks. 
121  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 89. 
122  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 89. Specific FATF Recommendations set out 
more precisely how this general principle applies to particular requirements. See Interpretive 
Note 2 to FATF Recommendation 1 in this regard. 
123  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 77. 
124  Including mobile money. 
125  The CDD obligations imposed by South African legislation have been comprehensively discussed 
in paras 3 and 4 above and will therefore not be repeated here.  
126  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach 85. 
127  Jenkins Developing Mobile Money Ecosystems 22-23. 
128  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 85. 
129  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 329. 
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in the context of mobile money,130 expecting jurisdictions and financial institutions to 
identify and assess the money laundering risks that may stem from: 
(a) the development of new products and new business practices, including new 
delivery mechanisms, and (b) the use of new or developing technologies for both 
new and pre-existing products.  
Under an RBA, the extent to which providers of NPPS should implement CDD 
measures131 will thus vary depending on the outcome of the application of 
Recommendation 15, consistent with the FATF Recommendations and the regulative 
measures in the specific jurisdiction.132 The underlying principle in this regard is that 
the intensity of AML measures should be commensurate with the risk posed by the 
NPPS133 – therefore, a uniform approach to CDD for NPPS is not desirable, since a 
uniform approach is not proportionate to the risks of different types of products and 
services.134 A low-value product or service should be subject to fewer enquiries than 
a product or service which is designed to facilitate larger transfers or account 
balances.135 If CDD measures are too stringent, only a small percentage of the total 
number of transactions within a jurisdiction will be subject to it. The overall number 
of transactions performed within a jurisdiction will not be fewer; there will merely be 
a greater percentage of transactions which are conducted informally and which will 
therefore not be subject to control measures such as CDD.136 As Alexandre and 
Eisenhart so eloquently put it: 
Applying a disproportionately high level of [CDD] to some accounts and/or 
transactions does not make them safer in any way but simply more expensive. 
Putting on a helmet, gloves, and a padded jacket before heading out for a stroll on 
a walkway similarly does not add much to one's security. It mostly adds cost and 
                                                          
130  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 89; De Koker 2013 WJLTA 177. While De Koker 
is of the opinion that Recommendation 15 is redundant in the light of FATF Recommendation 1, 
which contains more comprehensive and fundamental obligations regarding risk assessment (see 
De Koker 2013 WJLTA 177), it is submitted that Recommendation 15 can be viewed as a 
reiteration of the importance of risk assessment aimed at implementing an RBA, not only in 
terms of already existing AML regulations, but also when designing and adopting new AML 
measures for the purposes of regulating NPPS (see FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach 
para 89 in this regard). 
131  Specifically measures to identify clients and verify clients' identity. See FATF Guidance for a Risk-
Based Approach para 63. 
132  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 63. 
133  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 114. 
134  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 299. 
135  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 299. 
136  Ie financial exclusion is exacerbated. See Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 299. 
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inconvenience. Finding the right level of [CDD] is a matter of efficiency for the 
service providers and for the whole system.137  
The proposed solution is to implement a so-called "tiered" approach in terms of 
which different CDD measures apply to different types of products, services or 
accounts, as provided for in FATF Recommendation 10.138 
Interpretive Note 21 to Recommendation 10 makes specific provision for simplified 
CDD measures and lists the following examples: 
 Verifying the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner after the 
establishment of the business relationship (e.g. if account transactions exceed an 
established monetary threshold).  
 Reducing the frequency of customer identification updates.  
 Reducing the degree of on-going monitoring and scrutinising transactions based 
on a reasonable monetary threshold. 
 Not collecting specific information or carrying out specific measures to 
understand the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship, but 
inferring the purpose and nature from the type of transactions or business 
relationship established.139  
Simplified CDD never amounts to an absolute exemption or absence of CDD 
measures. Even in cases of simplified CDD, there must be rudimentary measures 
responding to all components of CDD.140 Simplified CDD measures simply influence 
the type and extent of the information required, and the means by which compliance 
with these minimum standards is effected.141 
In a lower risk situation, complying with CDD requirements as per FATF 
Recommendation 10 could, for example, involve less stringent means of obtaining 
information.142 The FATF Recommendations provide examples of instances where 
the risk of money laundering can be considered as potentially lower, with regard to 
certain variables.143 "Financial products or services that provide appropriately defined 
and limited services to certain types of clients, so as to increase access for financial 
                                                          
137  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 299-300. 
138  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 300. 
139  Also see FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 64. 
140  Ie identification and verification of the client's identity; identification of the beneficial owner; 
understanding the purpose of the business relationship; and on-going monitoring of the 
relationship. See FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 95. 
141  See FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 64. 
142  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 64. 
143  See Interpretive Notes 16 and 17 to FATF Recommendation 10 in this regard. 
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inclusion purposes" are explicitly included as such a lower risk example pertaining to 
NPPS.144 This makes it clear that FATF supports the development of financial 
products and services that will facilitate financial inclusion, whilst mitigating money 
laundering risks associated with financial exclusion.145  
5.3.2 Mitigating measures which facilitate the application of simplified customer due 
diligence 
The implementation of thresholds, or limitations, is an important consideration in 
respect to CDD and NPPS. Thresholds have proven to effectively mitigate service-
specific financial integrity risk, and could therefore be a measure towards the 
effective application of simplified CDD.146 The degree of threshold will vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and should be determined in accordance with a risk 
assessment of the specific NPPS.147  
As far as mobile money is concerned, thresholds could be placed on several different 
aspects of the service, including the following:148 
 the maximum amount of stored value that can be held in the account at any 
given time;  
 the maximum amount allowed per single transaction, including cash 
withdrawals;  
 the frequency or amount of transactions and cash withdrawals permitted per 
time period;149  
 the total value of transactions and cash withdrawals permitted per time 
period;150 
                                                          
144  Interpretive Note 17(b) to FATF Recommendation 10. Providers of NPPS should, however, also 
take note of the circumstances under which a client of an NPPS may be considered higher risk 
and ensure that there are procedures in place to conduct enhanced CDD measures in instances 
where higher money laundering risk is identified. See FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach 
para 64; Interpretive Note 15 to FATF Recommendation 10 for higher risk circumstances. 
145  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 70. 
146  See Interpretive Note 21 to FATF Recommendation 10, which specifically mentions instances 
where simplified CDD is to be implemented in parallel with thresholds. 
147  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 96. 
148  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 75. 
149  Eg per day, week, month or year. See FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 75. 
150  Eg per day, week, month or year. See FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 75. 
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 a combination of any or all of the above.  
Geographical or purchasing limitations could also act as mitigating factors which 
decrease the risk of mobile money being abused for money laundering purposes.151 
Applying thresholds or limitations to certain financial services could cause those 
services to become lower risk products due to the fact that the thresholds 
themselves lower the risk of money laundering.152  
The tiered approach yet again poses a feasible option for effectively implementing 
the above thresholds in conjunction with simplified CDD as part of an RBA, given the 
fact that the money laundering risk increases in proportion to the functionality of a 
specific NPPS. Such a tiered approach should be developed "on a case-by-case basis 
during the design phase of each NPPS."153 This will afford financial institutions the 
opportunity to consider applying different thresholds and other restrictions to 
different forms of NPPS in order to ensure that each individual NPPS remains a lower 
risk product, which in turns allows for the application of simplified CDD in respect of 
each form of NPPS. The level of CDD and other AML measures should increase as 
the functionality of the NPPS, and therefore also the risk, increases.154 This approach 
may provide financially excluded individuals the opportunity to open accounts or 
access other financial services, albeit with very limited functionality.155 Access to 
additional services156 should be allowed only once the client provides proof of 
identity and address.157  
  
                                                          
151  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 75. 
152  The stricter the limits that are set for particular types of products/services, the more likely it 
would be that the overall money laundering risk would be reduced and that those 
products/services could be considered as lower risks. See FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based 
Approach para 97; FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 74. 
153  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 72. 
154  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach paras 72, 74. 
155  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 74. 
156  Such as higher transaction limits or account balances or access through diversified delivery 
channels. See FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 74. 
157  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 74. 
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5.4  South Africa and the risk-based approach in terms of customer due 
diligence 
In their endeavour to develop banking products aimed at enhancing financial 
inclusion, South African authorities were mindful of the fact that many individuals 
living in South Africa typically did not have residential addresses which could be 
verified by means of formal documentation, and that imposing full CDD – which, 
under national legislation,158 includes obtaining and verifying a residential address – 
would accordingly be impractical. Such stringent CDD measures would have the 
effect that the majority of individuals for whom these products would be designed 
would not have access to them. The South African legislator thus devised Exemption 
17159 in this regard, in terms of which financial institutions are exempt from verifying 
the residential address of a client, provided certain requirements are met.160 If the 
client breaches compliance with these requirements after having opened such an 
account, the accountable institution must conduct full CDD before executing any 
further transactions associated with the account of the client in question.  
The FIC furthermore published Guidance Note 1 in April 2004,161 which is aimed at 
assisting accountable institutions and supervisory bodies with the practical 
application of the client identification obligations of FICA and in effect describes an 
RBA for the purposes of establishing and verifying identity. It is submitted that the 
guidance discussed under Guidance Note 3A is another instance where the FIC 
describes an RBA.  
FICA and the MLTFC Regulations compel accountable institutions to identify all their 
clients, unless circumstances exist which warrant the application of an exemption.162 
However, no uniform approach is prescribed for the methods which should be used 
to effect this identification or the levels of verification which should be applied.163 
The MLTFC Regulations state that accountable institutions must verify certain 
                                                          
158  Namely FICA. 
159  GN R1353 in GG 27011 of 19 November 2004. 
160  Also see Interpretive Note 16 to FATF Recommendation 10; World Bank Working Paper No 146 
61.  
161  GN 534 in GG 26278 of 30 April 2004. 
162  De Koker South African Money Laundering para 8.17. 
163  De Koker South African Money Laundering para 8.30. 
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particulars which they have obtained from a client or potential client by means of 
"information which can reasonably be expected to achieve such verification and is 
obtained by reasonably practical means".164 This suggests that an accountable 
institution has a discretion regarding the information which is necessary for the 
purposes of verification, as well as the means by which it should be obtained.165 In 
exercising this discretion, the "accuracy of the verification required and the level of 
effort invested to obtain such verification" should be balanced to ensure that the 
verification process is proportional to the nature of the risk which is posed by the 
transaction or business relationship.166 
It thus becomes apparent that South Africa has clearly followed an RBA, at least to 
some extent. However, no formal risk assessment regarding mobile money has been 
conducted to date.167 FATF makes it clear that in "all situations of simplified CDD",168 
the lower risk circumstances need to be validated "based on a thorough and 
documented risk assessment, conducted at the national, sectoral or at the financial 
institution level".169 According to the World Bank, it is worthwhile to go through the 
process of identifying, measuring, and decreasing potential money laundering risks 
given the developmental potential of mobile financial services170 – a statement with 
which the authors agree. 
5.5  Conclusion 
From the preceding analysis it can be concluded that while mobile money does 
indeed pose a threat to financial integrity if not regulated appropriately, it can also 
strengthen financial integrity by means of the eradication of financial exclusion. 
Reaching both the objectives of enhanced financial integrity and financial inclusion 
                                                          
164  Regs 4(3) and 16(2), own emphasis added.  
165  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion Annex 7; G20 Principles for Innovative Financial 
Inclusion Principle 9. 
166  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion Annex 7; G20 Principles for Innovative Financial 
Inclusion Principle 9. 
167  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 341. 
168  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 69, own emphasis added. 
169  Interpretive Note 16 to FATF Recommendations 10; FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion 
para 69. 
170  World Bank Working Paper No 146 2. 
M KERSOP & SF DU TOIT  PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
1661 
 
could be made possible by means of the application of an RBA, as provided for by 
the FATF Recommendations.171 This will typically entail simplified CDD measures.  
While the implementation of simplified CDD measures is not obligatory, the failure to 
do so could frustrate the objective of financial inclusion.172 These factors should be 
given due consideration in the application of an RBA to AML regulation. It is 
eventually the responsibility of each jurisdiction to ensure that its AML regime 
conforms to the FATF Recommendations, while remaining cognisant if its own 
circumstances and risk profile.173 Jurisdictions will have to decide on the different 
criteria required to benefit from a simplified CDD regime within their own unique 
national risk context, or require financial institutions to do so within their own risk 
management framework.174 
Taking everything into consideration, it would seem as if applying an RBA that is 
tiered in terms of services is the most suitable method for implementing AML 
measures without over-burdening the developmental thrust of NPPS.175  
6  Recommendations 
Throughout this article there have been indications that mobile money is a powerful 
tool to bring about financial inclusion,176 as was suggested in the Introduction. 
However, it has also become clear that mobile money poses significant money 
laundering risks if not suitably regulated. The question to be answered was: how can 
the preservation of financial integrity and the promotion of financial inclusion be 
balanced in such a way that mobile money can be utilised and developed effectively, 
thereby promoting financial inclusion, without this use being detrimental to financial 
integrity?  
                                                          
171  FATF Recommendation 1. 
172  De Koker 2013 WJLTA 177. 
173  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 116. 
174  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach para 116. 
175  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 329; World Bank Working Paper No 146 xiv. 
176  On the sidelines of this analysis, Du Toit has suggested that when looking for the acceptance of 
an alternative to legal tender (or cash), financial inclusion is an important consideration – any 
move away from cash should not make it more difficult to pay (Du Toit 2014b TSAR 815). It 
seems likely that this will be achieved in respect of mobile money, or one of the future variations 
thereof. 
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Although the opposite may have seemed true at first, it became apparent that 
mobile money serves the objectives of both financial inclusion and financial 
integrity,177 since financial exclusion is a money laundering risk, which means that 
financial inclusion can promote a more effective AML regime.178 Therefore, increased 
financial inclusion and increased financial integrity by means of an effective AML 
regime can – and should – be "complementary national policy objectives with 
mutually supportive policy goals".179 Mobile money can deliver on its promises for 
both financial inclusion and financial integrity only as long as it is not stifled by over-
regulation.180 Reaching both the objectives of enhanced financial integrity and 
enhanced financial inclusion can be made possible by means of the application of an 
RBA as provided for by the FATF Recommendations, specifically by implementing 
simplified CDD measures,181 which are optional but can be highly conducive to 
increased financial inclusion, and as a result, to financial integrity. 
South Africa currently has a comprehensive AML framework which has been 
criticised for being too stringent and has been held responsible for the fact that 
mobile money is not reaching its full potential in South Africa.182 Although initial 
research indicated that an over-cautious and uniform approach to CDD could indeed 
be what is stifling the widespread development and acceptance of mobile money, it 
became clear that South Africa is following an RBA to a large extent in the 
application of simplified CDD in certain instances. This is evident from measures 
such as Exemption 17, which also prescribes the use of thresholds in tandem with 
simplified CDD – completely in line with the FATF Recommendations.183 The problem 
which was identified is instead the fact that no formal risk assessment of mobile 
money products and services has been conducted in South Africa to date.184  
The reason why this is a problem is two-fold. First, the risk-based approach as 
provided for in FATF Recommendation 1 is a mandatory requirement, and the 
                                                          
177  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 287; FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 39. 
178  Also see FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 27. 
179  FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion para 29. 
180  Alexandre and Eisenhart 2013 WJLTA 287. 
181  FATF Recommendation 1. 
182  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 336; De Koker 2004 TSAR 742. 
183  Interpretive Note 21 to FATF Recommendation 10. 
184  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 341. 
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foundation of the risk-based approach is risk assessment.185 Secondly, FATF 
expressly requires that lower risk circumstances need to be validated "based on a 
thorough and documented risk assessment, conducted at the national, sectoral or at 
the financial institution level"186 in all instances of simplified CDD. This means that 
South African simplified CDD measures as contained in Exemption 17,187 Guidance 
Note 1188 and Guidance Note 3A fall in a grey area as far as the FATF 
Recommendations are concerned. The legislator has provided these instruments 
without conducting a national risk assessment and has left financial institutions to 
their own devices in applying an RBA to simplified CDD. 
It is submitted that this is causing confusion regarding South Africa's regulatory 
stance towards mobile money. The fact that there is no South African legislation 
which explicitly provides for or regulates mobile money,189 which is a unique financial 
service, contributes to the confusion and legal uncertainty. 
It is accordingly recommended that a formal money laundering risk assessment 
should be done on national level in order to establish a national standard for lower-
risk and higher-risk scenarios, in terms of which a general RBA, and particularly a 
simplified CDD, could be adopted in accordance with the FATF Recommendations.190 
According to the World Bank, a service-based approach is more effective than a 
provider-based approach for assessing actual money laundering risks for mobile 
financial services.191 It is therefore submitted that such an approach be kept in mind 
for the purposes of mobile money in particular, if and when a formal risk 
assessment, as suggested, takes place. The FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based 
Approach (2013): Prepaid Cards, Mobile Payments and Internet-Based Payment 
Services could furthermore be effectively employed in such an endeavour.  
                                                          
185  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 341. 
186  Interpretive Note 16 to FATF Recommendations10; FATF Guidance: AML and Financial Inclusion 
para 69, own emphasis added. 
187  GN R1353 in GG 27011 of 19 November 2004. 
188  GN 534 in GG 26278 of 30 April 2004. 
189  Admittedly, apart from bills of exchange and cheques (regulated in terms of the Bills of Exchange 
Act 34 of 1964), there is also little legislative guidance for other methods of payment, such as 
credit cards and credit transfers, especially regarding the essential legal nature and 
consequences of such transactions; see Du Toit 2014a TSAR 568 et seq in respect of consumer 
protection. 
190  Van Jaarsveld Aspects of Money Laundering 641; Lawack 2013 WJLTA 344. 
191  World Bank Working Paper No 146 xiii. 
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Once a formal risk assessment has been conducted and a national standard for 
lower-risk and higher-risk scenarios has been established, the application of a tiered 
RBA in terms of the risks presented by individual services, rather than the individual 
institutions offering them, would most likely be the most suitable method for 
implementing AML measures without hampering the developmental potential of 
NPPS.192 
Lastly, it is submitted that it would be in the interest of legal certainty if the 
legislator were to adopt specific regulatory measures which made provision for 
mobile money under different business models, thereby providing clarity and 
enhancing trust in mobile money services. 
  
                                                          
192  Lawack 2013 WJLTA 329; World Bank Working Paper No 146 xiv. 
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